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N his 1997 essay on interpretation,' Justice Scalia cites with approval
Professors Hart and Sacks who say that "American courts have no
intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation."'2 It is just so. In the cases are many references
to the meaning of text and to structure and to other contexts such as
legislative history, traditions, and precedent. There are inferences about
legislative purposes and what consequences are likely to be produced by
alternative interpretations. Also appearing in statutory interpretation
opinions are common sense rules for determining legislative meaning, in-
cluding reliance on administrative interpretations, policy considerations,
and avoiding constitutional issues. Rarely, however, is there discussion of
a general theory on why the various sources are relevant or what should
be their relative importance. At first glance, there appears to be nothing
but a hodge-podge of ways to discover or resolve ambiguity in order to
find legislative "intent." As Professor Jane Schacter has noted, "there are
significant features in the court's interpretive jurisprudence that con-
found the interpretive divides that structure so much contemporary
scholarship.3
There is no shortage of theories from which courts might choose.
Scholarly articles on statutory interpretation have proliferated over the
last ten to fifteen years, and there are at least half-a-dozen competing
* Columbia University, J.D. 1983; Clerk to Honorable Anthony Kennedy of U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit 1983-1984.
** University of Chicago, J.D. 1950; Columbia University, L.L.M. 1962; John Mar-
shall Law School, L.L.D. 1966; Columbia University, J.S.D. 1968; Clerk to Justice Minton
of U.S. Supreme Court 1950-1951.
Both are currently professor of law at McGeorge School of Law.
1. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTER-
PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994), quoted in Scalia, supra note 1, at 14.
3. Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond,
51 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1998).
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models, including new textualism,4 intentionalism, 5 "modified" intention-
alism,6 "legal process, '7 public justification,8 dynamic interpretation, 9 and
public choice theories. 10
Why has no single theory emerged? Are practical, policy, political, or
ideological considerations relating to whatever particular subject matter
is involved in a case more influential than interpretive methodology in
determining whether the court finds ambiguity or departs from the appar-
ent meaning of statutory language? If so, judges would understandably
not want to be shackled by a general theory.
A plausible alternative explanation for the cacophony is that we have
been asking the wrong question and searching for the wrong answer. By
defining our search as a search for a theory of statutory interpretation, we
implicitly assume (1) that the proper object of our search is statutes; (2)
that the proper goal of our search is to define a set of principles telling us
how to derive meaning from statutes; and (3) that it is possible to devise a
set of principles which can be objectively and reliably applied by different
judges to different statutes (since reproduceability is a necessary charac-
teristic of any useful and valid theory).
These assumptions may be misplaced. First, statutory interpretation is
a process engaged in by judges who are, after all, only human. The pro-
cess of deriving meaning from words, which lies at the heart of statutory
interpretation, is a peculiarly individual one. Computers can be program-
med to mimic a process of interpretation, but that does not mean that
each individual's process of interpretation is the same or can be made the
same.
Second, a judge or court may not so much engage in a process of statu-
tory interpretation as make a decision about the meaning of a statute.
The difference is a subtle, but important one. "Statutory interpretation"
makes it sound like a judge should take off his or her common law or
constitutional interpretation hat and should put on a statutory interpreta-
tion hat where the object of the game is to find the meaning of a statute.
But this assumes there actually are different hats for judges to wear. The
reality may be that each appellate judge has developed a general style of
decision-making that is applied, without significant modification, to all
types of legal and factual situations. The style of decision-making may be
4. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
6. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
(1975).
7. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Symposium on Statutory Interpretations: Legislative
History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 392-93 (1990).
8. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Jus-
tification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999).
9. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987).
10. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice: Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
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essentially invariant whether the issue involves interpretation of a statute,
a constitution, a contract, other judicial opinions, or even an appellate
record. Instead of searching for a general theory of how meaning can be
derived from statutes, we should be looking for a general theory of how
judges make decisions.
This hypothesis-that actual methods of statutory interpretation used
by judges are more closely aligned with a particular judge's overall ap-
proach to decision-making than with independent theories of statutory
interpretation-can be tested by attempting to apply general theories of
judicial decision-making to decisions that judges make about statutes. If
there is a match between general theories of judicial decision-making and
judicial decisions about statutes, it would suggest that decision-making is
a more fundamental activity than statutory interpretation, and that theo-
ries of statutory interpretation ultimately fail as a practical matter be-
cause they conflict with more basic judicial characteristics.
A substantial body of scholarship has already identified major decision-
making trends in our judicial history. In light of that scholarship, we can
reasonably assert that American courts and judges have for the most part
adhered to four competing theories of decision-making.11 One or the
other of the four theories has predominated during different eras of
American legal history.' 2 Insofar as they relate to statutory interpreta-
tion, the theories, differentiated according to what they seek to discover
and implement, and arranged in the order of increasing use of non-tex-
tual sources, are as follows:
1. Formalism: Discover what the text means in its context, without
reference to legislative history.
2. Holmesian: Discover what the text means in light of the legisla-
ture's underlying purposes.
3. Natural Law: Discover what reason suggests was intended in light
of all reliable sources.
4. Instrumental: Discover what good results were intended by the leg-
islature and help insure their reality.
11. For further development of this theme, see R. RANDALL KELSO & CHARLES D.
KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODuc-nON (1984). See also Charles D. Kelso & R. Ran-
dall Kelso, Our Nine Tribunes: A Review of Professor Lusky's Call for Judicial Restraint, 5
SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 1289 (1995); Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to
Sue: Transformations in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. TOL. L.
REV. 93 (1996); R. Randall Kelso, Separation of Powers Doctrine on the Modern Supreme
Court and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-Making, 20 PPn. L. REV. 531(1993); R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Ap-
proaches to Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.
121 (1994). For links between these judicial theories and politics see Charles D. Kelso &
R. Randall Kelso, Politics and the Constitution: A Review of Judge Malcolm Wilkey's Call
for a Second Constitutional Convention, 27 PAC. L.J. 1213 (1996).
12. This proposition was explored in GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
1, 11-12 (1977). Gilmore acknowledged that a similar theory had been advanced by Karl
Llewellyn in The Common Law Tradition (1960). See also, Karl N. Llewellyn, On the Cur-




In terms of which theory has tended to predominate in American legal
history, the pattern in statutory interpretation (as well as in constitutional
law and common law development) is roughly as follows: natural law
(1789-1872), formalism (1872-1937), Holmesian (1937-1954), instrumen-
talism (1954-1986), and modern natural law (1986-1999).
Today's Supreme Court cannot be expected to settle on a single ap-
proach because each theory has one or more adherents on the Court.
Justice Scalia has described and employs textualism (which is an applica-
tion of formalism). Justice Thomas likewise follows that methodology.
Holmesianism (which views statutory interpretation as a search for mean-
ing in light of its purpose) is today represented by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist. The lone survivor of the instrumentalist Court of the 60s and 70s
(which sought for just results whenever possible) is Justice Stevens
(though Justice Ginsburg sometimes also leans in this direction). The re-
maining Justices tend to reflect in their opinions the natural law approach
of Chief Justice John Marshall (an approach in which all of the above
sources are relevant and the goal is to reach a decision in accord with the
dictates of reason). In view of the diverging of perspectives, there is little
wonder that current cases include a number of instances in which the
Justices criticize one another's use of a methodology for interpretation -
particularly the extent to which legislative history and inferred purpose
are used to shed light on the meaning of statutory language.
This article describes these theories, provides current examples of the
theories at work and in opposition to one another, and concludes with
general observations and evaluative suggestions. We conclude that statu-
tory interpretation should be viewed by scholars as embedded within
deeply ingrained methods of decision-making which confounds efforts to
impose a single theory of statutory interpretation upon the courts.
II. THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION
A set of ideas on statutory interpretation, worthy of being called a the-
ory,13 should attempt to answer at least these four questions about the
process:
1. What is its goal?
2. What evidence is relevant?
3. What is the hierarchy among rules of construction that are avail-
able for dealing with relevant material?
13. In defining "theory" in this fashion, we have adopted a convention that traces back
to Aristotle. He concluded that to know anything one must know its causes and that there
are four kinds of cause.
Ideally the four causes are used to explain any thing or situation, although on
occasion only two or three may be accessible to investigation: the material
cause out of which a thing comes to be (as the silver of a bowl); the form or
definition (as the shape of the bowl); the efficient cause (as the hammering of
the silversmith); and the final cause (as the purpose for which the bowl is
intended).
ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE XX (Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
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4. To what extent is an interpreter -free to use his or her ideas of
sound policy as a guide?
Below are answers to each question as provided by the four models of
decision-making that at one time or another have been dominant in
American legal history.
A. FORMALISM (TEXTUALISM)
Justice Scalia's 1997 essay on statutory interpretation undertakes ex-
plicitly to answer each of the four questions. According to Scalia, the
goal of statutory interpretation is to find "a sort of 'objectified' intent -
the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law,
placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris."'1 4 The reason justify-
ing this goal, said Scalia, is that it would be incompatible with democratic
government to have the meaning of law determined by what the lawgiver
meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. He explained that
"[t]he text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed."'15
Relevant evidence of intent, according to Justice Scalia, includes the
words and their context in the law. It does not include legislative history.
Legislative history, including statements made in floor debates, commit-
tee reports, and committee testimony, "should not be used as an authori-
tative indication of a statute's meaning."'1 6 Justice Scalia objects to
treating such material as relevant because (1) the intent of the legislature
is not the proper criterion of law, (2) in view of today's methods for pre-
paring staff reports and floor debate, legislative history is not a likely
source of legislative intent, and (3) the separation of powers requires that
"[w]hatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the
executive or (ultimately) the judicial branch.' 17
Rules of construction that may be used include all those which are
common sense and do not load the dice for or against a particular re-
sult.' 8 Finally, the interpreter should make an effort to insure that his or
14. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17. To the above, Scalia added, "As Bishop's old treatise
nicely put it, elaborating upon the usual formulation: '[T]he primary object of all rules for
interpreting statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent; or, exactly, the meaning which the
subject is authorized to understand the legislature intended." Id. (quoting JOEL PRENTISS
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 57-58
(1882)).
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 29-30.
17. Id. at 35; see id. at 31-35.
18. Examples of dice-loading rules criticized by Justice Scalia include the rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed or that remedial
statutes are to be liberally construed to achieve their purposes. Dice-loading rules that
embody common sense are, to Scalia,
merely an exaggerated statement of what normal, no-thumb-on-the-scales in-
terpretation would produce anyway. For example, since congressional elimi-
nation of state sovereign immunity is such an extraordinary act, one would
normally expect it to be explicitly decreed rather than offhandedly implied -
so something like a "clear statement" rule is merely normal interpretation.




her views on policy do not intrude into the process. Considering what is
the most desirable resolution of a case is the attitude of the common-law
judge. This attitude is appropriate only in common law cases. The reason
is found in the text of the Constitution, which says, "All legislative Pow-
ers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' 19
Examples of the methodology advocated by Justice Scalia are readily
available in current opinions by Justices Scalia and Thomas on both statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation. Drawing on what Scalia and
Thomas have written for the Court (or in dissent or concurrence), it ap-
pears likely that their votes in all cases are formulated at least in large
part from a textual perspective. Evidence will be presented below.
B. HOLMESIANISM
In the years 1937-1954, a majority of the Court followed such Holme-
sian ideas as the belief that great deference is owed to legislatures which
deal with social and economic problems because this assures implementa-
tion of the people's will. Such deference requires looking for the intent
of the legislature as embodied in its words in order to carry out its pur-
poses. By applying such ideas to both the Constitution and New Deal
legislation, the Court during the era of 1937-1954 was able to sustain and
implement most of the later New Deal enactments.
Holmes himself always spoke of searching for the objective meaning of
words used in a statute, and not for the legislature's subjective intent. He
concluded that: "we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words
would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in
the circumstances in which they were used .... ,,20
The most complete statement of a Holmesian theory of statutory inter-
pretation by a Supreme Court Justice appears in Justice Frankfurter's
1947 Columbia Law Review article.21 Frankfurter said that "the function
in construing a statute is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the
legislature. '22 The meaning of words for him included the purposes they
were intended to serve. Frankfurter expressed this idea in several ways.
He approved of Judge Learned Hand's statement that the art of interpre-
tation is the proliferation of purpose. He then rephrased that epigram as
follows: "I should say that the troublesome phase of construction is the
determination of the extent to which extraneous documentation and ex-
ternal circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory
that they were part of it, written in ink discernible to the judicial eye."'23
19. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
20. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 417-18 (1899).
21. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527 (1947).
22. Id. at 533.
23. Id. at 529. This central problem for any "plain meaning" rule is further explored in
R. Randall Kelso & C. Kevin Kelso, Appeals in Federal Courts by Prosecuting Entities
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The judicial eye could be aided by legislative history, although the
judge must guard against "[s]purious use of legislative history. '2 4 Re-
garding the hierarchy of sources, canons of construction should be used
rarely, with a recognition that they are not true rules of law but are, in-
stead, what Justice Holmes called "axioms of experience. 2 5
Frankfurter warned against the judicial rewriting of statutes. He said
that "[w]hatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might
wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and eviscera-
tion."'26 A judge "must not read in by way of creation. He must not read
out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradiction. '27
This Holmesian approach can be found in opinions by former Justices
Frankfurter, Burton, Vinson, Clark, Minton, Harlan, Whittacker, Stewart,
and White. Today, the lone Holmesian on the Court is Chief Justice
Rehnquist, as noted in examples provided below.
C. INSTRUMENTALISM
The instrumentalist approach is sometimes called a policy or result-ori-
ented approach. Its premise is to assume that the legislature intended
good results from its enactments and that the courts, in interpreting and
applying legislation, should facilitate those good results. Judges who fol-
low this approach rarely admit that this is what they are doing because of
concern for appearing to violate the separation of powers with "judicial
legislation." However, scholars have been less inhibited. John Hart Ely,
then Dean of Stanford Law School, in a notable article28 quoted Judge J.
Skelly Wright as saying, "[tjhe ultimate test of the Justices' work, I sug-
gest, must be goodness."' 29 Some academics have argued in favor of the
method, saying that legislation should be interpreted in light of the needs
and goals of present day society. 30
Exemplars of this approach who formerly served on the Court are Jus-
tices Douglas, Warren, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Today only
Justice Stevens remains as a reminder of the era when instrumentalists
formed a majority on the Court and remade much of constitutional law
along with creatively interpreting a great deal of legislation in order to
reach good results.
other than the United States: The Plain Meaning Rule Revisited, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 187
(1981).
24. Frankfurter, supra note 21, at 543.
25. Id. at 544.
26. Id. at 533.
27. Id.
28. John Hart Ely, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 16
(1978).
29. Id. at 16.
30. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart & Alber M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law (10th ed. 1958). The authors said that a court in inter-
preting a statute should: ask itself not only what the legislation means abstractly, or even
on the basis of legislative history, but also what it ought to mean in terms of the needs and
goals of our present day society.
2000]
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Justice Stevens' views often put him at odds with today's Court. He is
today the most frequent dissenter. For example, in the 1998 term, he filed
dissents in three of the four 8-1 cases involving statutory interpretation.
Further, in the six 7-2 cases he wrote one dissent and joined in another.
D. NATURAL LAW
In the days of Chief Justice John Marshall, there was an established
tradition of statutory interpretation. The goal was to discover and carry
out the intention of the legislature. That intent, according to both Black-
stone's Commentaries and Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law, was
the reason or final cause of the law, i.e., the end which the legislator in-
tended to obtain or the effects intended to be produced by it.31 A classic
statement of the approach can be found in Heydon's Case,32 decided in
1584. In that case, Lord Coke called for judges to suppress the mischief
for which the common law did not provide and to add life to the cure and
remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act.33 In decid-
ing whether to extend or restrain language, the court was to consider "eq-
uities" that, in the words of Professor Crosskey, "were derived from what
was known diversely as 'the reason,' 'the purpose,' 'the spirit,' or 'the
intention,' of a statute, or other writing, considered as a whole, and with
reference to the circumstances in which it had been made, written, or
adopted. '34 Such circumstances would of course include legislative his-
tory. And the Court may consider what other "experts" have to say, par-
ticularly agencies delegated authority to implement the law.
This method is reflected today in the opinions of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and, to an extent, Breyer and Ginsburg. In today's 5-4
and 6-3 cases, the formalists (Scalia and Thomas) tend to join with the
Holmesian (Rehnquist). At the other extreme is the instrumentalist (Ste-
vens), with whom Justice Ginsburg often agrees. The outcomes of most
closely contested cases thus hinge on the natural law Justices, particularly
Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor, who tend to join with the formal-
ists and the Holmesian Chief Justice.
31. See WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE His-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 366-67 (1950).
32. 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 76 Eng. Rptr. 637 (1584).
33. See id. Lord Coke said:
[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal
or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to
be discerned and considered: 1st. What was the common law before the
making of the Act? 2nd. What was the mischief and the defect for which the
common law did not provide. 3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath re-
solved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth. And, 4th.
The true reason of the remedy, and then the office of all the Judges is always
to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of
the mischief ... and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according
to the true intent of the makers of the Act ....
Id. at 638.
34. CROSSKEY, supra note 31, at 365.
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III. THE THEORIES APPLIED IN THE 1998 TERM OF THE
SUPREME COURT
To explore how the various approaches to statutory interpretation cur-
rently operate and interrelate, we have attempted in what follows to high-
light the methodology used by various Justices during the 1998 term of
the Supreme Court. During that term the Court decided seventy-five
cases of which forty-one involved statutory interpretation in which an
opinion was rendered by an identified Justice.35 The extent to which the
Court was unified or divided was as follows:
Number of Statutory









Where the Court was closely divided there was, of course, more debate
on interpretation methodology. However, even the unanimous cases pro-
vide interesting insights into the methodology used by an author without
objection from his or her colleagues. 36 After trying several different ways
35. There was also one per curiam opinion in a statutory interpretation case: Roberts
v. Galen of Va., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999). The opinion dealt with the duty of a hospital
under 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1999) to provide "such treatment as may be required to
stabilize the medical condition" in emergency situations. 42 U.S.C. § 1395. The defendant
hospital had transferred the injured plaintiff to another hospital without attempting to sta-
bilize her condition. See id. at 686. The court held that plaintiff could recover for a viola-
tion without proving that there was an improper motive, such as indigency, race or sex, and
that the text of the statute does not require an appropriate stabilization, nor can it reason-
ably be read to require an improper motive. See id. at 687. The Court noted that although
it was not dispositive, a further indication of the correctness of the Court's decision was
defendant's concession that the "motive test" applied by the court below lacked support in
any of the traditional methods of statutory construction. See id.
36. When an opinion is written for a Court that has voted unanimously to support a
certain result, the author knows that it should not ordinarily be difficult for a majority of
the other Justices to join in an opinion. The case may not be complex and the decision may
be supported by all of the various factors that are given weight by the various methodolo-
gies of interpretation. So long as the author sticks fairly close to textual interpretation, the
opinion is not likely to generate a dissent. Justices who may use different methodologies
than the author may tend to ignore the possibility of a methodological comment because
there is no chance of changing the result, and the case may not justify the investment of
time and energy. Debate on interpretation methodology is likely only where the Court is
more sharply divided. In the sharply divided cases, a well-written opinion usually is neces-
sary to hold a majority or to influence a contrary vote and thus change the majority. An
attempt may be made to write a particularly persuasive opinion to influence future judges
with respect to whether the case, as a precedent, should be treated narrowly or broadly, or,
possibly, be overruled.
SMU LAW REVIEW
of organizing the materials, we have settled upon presenting the work of
each Justice, according to the classification scheme discussed above. For
each justice, we begin with dissenting or concurring opinions because that
is where a justice has the fewest constraints in presenting his or her own
views. As will be seen, each justice carries over into majority opinions
elements of his or her decision-making process, with only limited adjust-
ments and accommodations to other members of the majority. Where
debate was sparked, we have suggested the terms in which it took place.
A. FORMALIST OPINIONS IN 1998
1. Justice Scalia
In the 1998 term, Justice Scalia filed only two dissenting opinions in
statutory interpretation cases. As one might expect, in both instances he
objected to the Court's departure from what he saw as the natural mean-
ing of the words. In the first case, Holloway v. United States,37 the Court,
in an opinion by Justice Stevens, held seven to two that the federal car
jacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, which criminalizes carjacking "with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily harm," requires the Government
to prove only that when the defendant took control of the driver's car,
the defendant possessed the conditional intent to seriously harm or kill
the driver if necessary to steal the car. According to the majority, the
government does not have to prove an unconditional intent to kill or
harm in all events. Justice Scalia, dissenting, said that:
in customary English usage the unqualified word "intent" does not
usually connote a purpose that is subject to any conditions precedent
except those so remote in the speaker's estimation as to be effec-
tively nonexistent - and it never connotes a purpose that is subject to
a condition which the speaker hopes will not occur.38
Scalia noted that the Court did not claim that the word "intent" has
acquired a "term-of-art" status giving it the conditional meaning ascribed
by the Court.39 He criticized the majority for ultimately resting its deci-
sion on the opinion that the purpose of the statute, to deter carjacking, is
better served by including conditional intent.40 He added that limits on
the "means employed to achieve the policy goal are no less a 'purpose' of
the statute than the policy goal itself."'41 Finally, he said that the Court
can best judge what Congress intended by the words Congress enacted
rather than by some intuition as to what it "obviously intended" to pro-
hibit.42 He would find the statute utterly unambiguous but, if ambiguity
existed, the rule of lenity would require the ambiguity to be resolved in
the defendant's favor.43 Alluding to practical consequences, he closed his
37. 119 S. Ct. 966 (1999).
38. Id. at 972-73.
39. See id. at 973.
40. See id. at 975.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 976.
[Vol. 53
FOUR THEORIES IN DISARRAY
opinion by saying that it was "inadvisable to introduce the new possibility
of 'conditional-intent' prosecutions into a modem federal criminal-law
system characterized by plea bargaining, where they will be predictably
used for in terrorem effect."'44
Justice Scalia's other dissent was filed in United States v. Rodriguez-
Moreno,45 where he voiced a rare disagreement with Justice Thomas, who
was writing for the Court. The Court held that venue in a prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for using or carrying a firearm "during and in
relation to any crime of violence" was proper in any district where a kid-
napping was carried on, even if the defendant carried a gun only in a
district other than that where prosecution was brought.46 Justice Thomas
explained that the crime consisted of distinct parts and, where that was
so, precedent established that the whole may be tried where any part can
be proved to have been done. 47 Justice Scalia, dissenting with Justice Ste-
vens (a rare combination), said the two parts of the crime were tied to-
gether by the word "during." Scalia said that § 924(c)(1) was violated
"only so long as, and where, both continuing acts are being committed
simultaneously. ' 48 This conclusion was supported by an allusion to the
Constitution:
The short of the matter is that this defendant, who has a constitu-
tional right to be tried in the State and district where his alleged
crime was "committed," U.S. Const., Art III, § 2, cl.3; Amdt. 6, has
been prosecuted for using a gun during a kidnapping in a State and
district where all agree he did not use a gun during a kidnapping. If
to state this case is not to decide it, the law has departed further from
the meaning of language than is appropriate for a government that is
supposed to rule (and to be restrained) through the written word.49
Scalia's disagreement was not over the method used by Justice Thomas,
the other currently serving Justice whose opinions in statutory interpreta-
tion cases embody a textualist approach. The key difference was that Jus-
tice Thomas and seven other Justices perceived that the defendant was
guilty of using a gun "during and in relation to" a kidnapping if at any
time during the ongoing crime of kidnapping a gun had been used. Ac-
cording to Justice Thomas, the statute did not define a "point-in-time"
offense, i.e., an offense committed only when and where the firearm was
used.50 Since the crime consisted of distinct parts, a kidnapping and using
a gun during and in relation to that kidnapping, precedent allowed the
crime to be tried where any part of the crime was committed. S' Justice
Thomas did not engage in any analysis of consequences.
44. Id. at 977.
45. 119 S. Ct. 1239 (1999).
46. See id. at 1244.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 1245 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1245-46.




Justice Scalia concurred in the hotly contested case in which the Court
held that 13 U.S.C. § 195 prohibits the use of sampling in calculating the
population for purposes of apportionment, Department of Commerce v.
United States House of Representatives.52 Scalia, with Justices Thomas,
Rehnquist, and Kennedy, first disassociated himself from the portions of
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion which supported the result by con-
sidering remarks of individual legislators and committees and what they
did not say. The main thrust of Scalia's opinion, however, was that it is
doubtful whether the constitutional requirement of an "actual Enumera-
tion" is satisfied by statistical sampling.53 In support of this doubt he
cited definitions contained in roughly contemporaneous dictionaries and
the long standing tradition adopted by Congress which forbade the use of
sampling techniques in conducting the apportionment census. Again con-
cluding with a practical look at consequences, Justice Scalia said that "[t]o
give Congress the power ... to select among various estimation tech-
niques ... [would] give the party controlling Congress the power to dis-
tort representation in its own favor. [G]enuine enumeration may be the
most accurate way of determining population with minimal possibility of
partisan manipulation. 54
In the 1998 term, each Justice wrote at least one unanimous opinion in
a statutory interpretation case. 55 We begin at the formalist end of the
spectrum, with the three opinions in unanimous cases written by Justice
Scalia. In each opinion he gave as the first and primary reason for the
Court's holding that it was the "more natural" reading of the words. He
went on, however, in two of the cases to justify that reading by reference
to other matters. Specifically, he referred to precedents dealing with the
same or similar legislation or to principles that did not load the dice but
which set up presumptions for interpreting words one way or another. In
two of the cases, Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by alluding to what
he considered as the likely unfortunate practical consequence of deciding
the case other than by using the meaning he attributed to the statutory
language. Thus, even though he appeared to give first and heaviest
weight to the text and did not once refer to legislative history, he did
mention some of the variables which tend to weigh more heavily in the
opinions of other Justices. It is not clear whether he did so out of respect
for the views of Justices who hold such matters highly relevant, or to hold
votes in place, or whether his own reading of the language was influenced
by those matters. Here are details on these relatively easy cases:
52. 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999).
53. See id. at 781.
54. Id. at 787.
55. The tradition has been that when the Chief Justice is in the majority, he assigns the
opinion to be written. When the Chief Justice is not in the majority, the next most senior
Justice who is in the majority will assign the opinion. Current seniority begins with Justice
Stevens and continues with Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Gins-
burg, and Breyer.
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In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,56 Justice Scalia wrote for
a 9-0 Court held that the National Labor Relations Act authorized a
union-negotiated waiver of employees' statutory right to a judicial forum
for claims of employment discrimination only if the waiver was clear and
unmistakable. To support the clarity requirement, Scalia drew by analogy
on Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 57 where the Court had held that
only by clear and unmistakable language could a union waive its officers's
statutory right to be free of antiunion discrimination. In accordance with
his essay on interpretation, Scalia made no reference to legislative his-
tory, context, interpretive maxims, or substantive policies to justify the
clarity rule or to support his finding that the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not contain a clear waiver.
Another 9-0 Scalia opinion appeared in United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of California.5 8 The case was a prosecution for violating a fed-
eral statute which made it illegal to give anything of value to a public
official "for or because of any official act performed or to be performed
by such public official."'59 The District Court was held in error for in-
structing that the government need not prove that the gratuity was linked
to a specific or identifiable official act or to any act at all. Justice Scalia
found four reasons why a link had to be established between the gift and
a specific official act. His reasons were consistent with a search for mean-
ing in the overall context of the law, although he also mentioned an unde-
sirable consequence of an alternative interpretation:
1. Linkage seemed the "more natural" meaning.
2. The government's reading would go too far, as for example by
making it illegal for the President to receive token gifts from champion-
ship sports teams invited to the White House.
3. When Congress has wanted to create broadly prophylactic criminal
prohibitions on gift giving, it has done so in precise fashion.
4. In the intricate web of laws dealing with the giving and receipt of
gifts, where precisely targeted prohibitions are common-place, and more
general prohibitions are qualified by numerous exceptions, a statute that
can be interpreted as either broad or narrow should reasonably be inter-
preted narrowly.60
56. 119 S. Ct. 391 (1998). In this case the defendant employer claimed that an arbitra-
tion clause in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) prevented plaintiff employee from
filing a federal court action for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Citing precedents, Justice Scalia said that not only is there no presumption of arbitrability
with respect to the meaning of a federal act, but, in addition, any CBA requirement to
arbitrate must be perfectly clear. That was not true of the CBA involved here because its
provision for arbitrating "matters under dispute" could be read to indicate matters in dis-
pute under the contract (rather than being a clear and unmistakable waiver of covered
employees' rights to a judicial forum for federal claims of employment discrimination).
Left open was the question whether a CBA can waive employees' rights to a judicial fo-
rum. See id. at 396.
57. 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983).
58. 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A).
60. See Sun-Diamond, 119 S. Ct. at 1407-08.
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The third of Justice Scalia's opinions for a unanimous Court was Your
Home Visiting Nurse Serv., Inc. v. Shalala.61 There he relied on the natu-
ral meaning of words, followed up by deference to an interpretation given
by the responsible administrator and concern about interference with leg-
islative purpose that would be produced by any other decision. In the
case, a health services provider was dissatisfied with the initial reimburse-
ment decision of a fiscal intermediary (acting as agent for the Secretary of
Health and Human Services). The provider was also dissatisfied with the
intermediary's refusal to reopen its determination despite new and mate-
rial evidence. The question was whether the provider had a right to ap-
peal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. That Board has
jurisdiction to review a "final determination ... as to the amount of total
program reimbursement due the provider .... ",62 The Court agreed with
the Secretary that the statutory phrase defining jurisdiction did not in-
clude a refusal to reopen because such action is not a final determination
on amount, but rather is a refusal to make a new determination. 63 Justice
Scalia gave three reasons:
1. It seems the more natural reading.
2. Since it is within the bounds of reasonable interpretation, the deci-
sion of the Secretary is entitled to deference under Chevron.64
3. This result is consistent with Califano v. Sanders,65 where judicial
review of a reopening denial would, as here, frustrate the time limits
placed on alternative ways of seeking review of administrative
decisions. 66
Several other opinions for which Justice Scalia wrote the majority opin-
ion were more complex. Again, however, in those opinions he did not
refer to legislative history and he relied primarily on the surface meaning
of words. For example, artful dealing with words was apparent when
Scalia wrote for the Court in the 8-1 case of Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee.67 In this case several aliens resisted deporta-
tion proceedings by filing suit in a district court. They alleged unconstitu-
tional selective enforcement of immigration laws in violation of the First
and Fifth Amendments. While their suit was pending, Congress passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), 68 which narrowed federal jurisdiction. One provision,
61. 119 S. Ct. 930 (1999).
62. Id. at 933.
63. See id.
64. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (deference is owed to an interpretive decision of those responsible for ad-
ministering an Act, if the interpretation is reasonable).
65. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
66. 119 S. Ct. at 933-34. Justice Scalia also held that this position was not inconsistent
with the duty of the Secretary to provide for suitable retroactive corrective adjustments.
And, the Medicare Act forbade judicial review of the refusal to reopen. Nor could a man-
damus issue since petitioner had not shown the violation of a clear nondiscretionary duty.
67. 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999).
68. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-28, 110 Stat. 3009.
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Section 309(c)(1), provided that in the case of an alien who is in exclusion
or deportation proceedings, the new amendments shall not apply to de-
portation proceedings already underway. However, Section 306(c)(1)
provided that Section 1252(g) should apply without limitation to claims
arising from all past, pending or future proceedings. Arguably, this was a
contradiction. However, by taking a close look at the words of Section
1252(g), Justice Scalia reconciled the two sections and held that Section
1252(g) should apply. It said that:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claims by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.69
Justice Scalia said that the mention of three discrete events along the
road to deportation was not a shorthand way of referring to all claims
arising from deportation proceedings. 70 He backed up this conclusion by
noting first that there was no other instance in the United States Code
where language such as this has been used to impose a general jurisdic-
tional limitation. Second, he pointed out that the three kinds of decisions
specified in Section 1252(g) were subject to the discretion of the Attorney
General. There would be unfortunate interference with that discretion if
actions could be brought in situations where the Attorney General chose
not to exercise the discretion. For such cases, Congress would want the
withdrawal of jurisdiction provided in Section 1252(g) to apply even to
pending cases. 71
The most complex decision written for the Court by Justice Scalia in
the 1998 term was AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd..72 In that 5-3-1 case
the questions included whether the Federal Communications Commission
had the authority to implement pricing regulations for local phone service
companies that are required to share their network with competitors
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Alluding to the fact that the
1996 Act expressly provided that it was to be inserted into the old Com-
munications Act of 1934, Justice Scalia held that the FCC had authority
to design a pricing methodology for sharing. His basic premise was the
fact that the 1938 amendment to Section 201(b) of the 1934 law provided
in general terms that "[t]he Commission may prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this Act. '' 73 With reference to that language Justice Scalia
said, "We think that the grant in § 201(b) means what it says... . ,74 Jus-
tice Scalia acknowledged that 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) withdrew FCC jurisdic-
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994 & Supp. III).
70. 119 S. Ct. at 943.
71. See id. at 943-45.
72. 119 S. Ct. 721 (1999).
73. Act of May 31, 1938, ch. 296, 52 Stat. 588 (1938) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (1994)).
74. Id. at 730.
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tion over "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or
regulations" with respect to "intrastate communication services. .... -75
He replied, however, that this statutory language did not include pricing
regulations with respect to local competition.76 Justice Breyer, in a sep-
arate concurring opinion, agreed with Justice Thomas, but went on to
stress the Act's purpose to encourage greater local service competition, a
purpose that he said doesn't require or suggest reading the Act to change
radically the scope of local regulator's traditional rate-setting powers. 77
From a review of his recent opinions in statutory interpretation cases, it
would appear that Justice Scalia is closely adhering to the theory he ad-
vanced in his essay on interpretation-with the possible qualification that
he adverts to consequences more readily than the essay suggests.
2. Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas is the other currently serving formalist on the Court.
His most thorough discussion of interpretation methodology was his con-
currence, with Justice Scalia, to the Court's judgment in Bank of America
v. 203 N. Lasalle St. Partnership.78 The majority opinion by Justice Souter
began discussing the statute by characterizing its language as inexact. 79
That was followed by an extended discussion of legislative history. Jus-
tice Thomas critically asserted that, as in Dewsnup v. Timm,80 the Court
had found ambiguity simply because the litigants and amici had offered
competing interpretations of the statute. This approach, said Thomas, en-
abled any good idea from earlier practice or legislative history to be
75. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994)).
76. In one respect Justice Scalia found that the FCC had gone beyond its statutory
authority. In determining what network elements of local telephone companies should be
made available to competitors, Section 251(d)(2) of the statute called for the FCC to con-
sider what was "necessary" or what failures to provide access would "impair" the ability of
the carrier seeking access to provide the services it seeks to offer. In considering what was
"necessary" and what might "impair," the FCC did not consider the availability of ele-
ments outside a local network. Scalia said this was "not in accord with the ordinary and
fair meaning of these terms." Id. at 735. If Congress had wanted to give blanket access to
local networks, Scalia reasoned, it would not have included a requirement that necessity
and impairment be considered. See id. Once again, Scalia did not refer to legislative
history.
Justice Souter agreed with Justice Scalia that the FCC had jurisdiction but would give
Chevron deference to its decisions on access. They were within what he considered the
bounds of reasonableness since the words "necessary" and "impair" are ambiguous in be-
ing susceptible to a fairly wide range of meanings. Justice Thomas, writing a rare dissent to
a Scalia opinion, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer, said that the FCC's regu-
latory authority did not extend beyond intrastate services because, applying ejusdem
generis, the Section 201(b) grant of power to the FCC is limited by the specific restriction
in 201(a) to "interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio." Even if there was an
ambiguity, Thomas reasoned, it should be resolved on the assumption that Congress in-
tended to preserve local authority (which, historically, had been exercised over the tele-
phone industry by the states). See id. at 743-45. Thus did federalism play an important role
in support of Justice Thomas' reasoning on the meaning of statutory language.
77. See id. at 746-48.
78. 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
79. Id. at 1417.
80. 502 U.S. 410, 416 (1992).
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crammed into the statute. He would begin interpretation not with exter-
nal sources but with the text itself. The question in this bankruptcy case
was whether a plan which impaired the interest of certain bondholders
could be approved if persons who owned equity interests in the debtor
(i.e., its stockholders) received any property under the plan "on account
of" their junior interest. Looking to common understandings of the
phrase, Justice Thomas said the statutory language obviously denotes no
more than that there must be some type of causal relationship between
the junior interest and the property received or retained. However,
Thomas asserted that the Court had applied a judgmental and balancing
test in answering the question. 81
Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia's dissent in Holloway v.
United States,82 the case which approved a conditional intent reading of
the federal carjacking statute. Thomas said that absent a more settled
tradition in criminal law holding that the specific intent to commit an act
may be conditional, it cannot be presumed that Congress was familiar
with such usage when it enacted the statute. 83
In his second dissent in a statutory interpretation case, filed in Cedar
Rapids Community School District v. Garret F.,84 Justice Thomas, joined
by Justice Kennedy, referred first to textual interpretation and then said
his textual interpretation was supported by the statute's structure and
purpose. The issue was whether the "medical services" exclusion from a
school district's duty to provide disabled children with special education
and related services is limited to services that must be performed by a
physician, as held by the majority, or whether the medical services exclu-
sion includes more broadly all services medical in nature and, specifically,
health-related services that cannot be performed by school nurses as part
of their normal duties.85 Justice Thomas said that the broader meaning of
the exclusion was clear, and deference to a contrary agency regulation
would not be appropriate because "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter .... ",86
81. 119 S. Ct. at 1421. Justice Souter, for the majority, after reciting a need to recon-
cile congressional purposes of preserving going concerns and maximizing property avail-
able to satisfy creditors, said that fairness and equity doesn't require that creditors always
be paid in full before stockholders can retain equity interests. Thus, causation between the
old equity holdings and subsequent property should not be found by the absolute rule
suggested by Justice Thomas. Instead, the Court should ask whether old equity's later
property came at a price that failed to provide the greatest possible addition to the bank-
rupt estate or the equity holders obtained or preserved an ownership interest for less than
someone else would have paid. See id. at 1421-22.
82. 119 S. Ct. 966 (1999).
83. See id. at 977 (Thomas, C., dissenting).
84. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
85. See id. at 996.
86. Id. at 1000. As a supporting argument, Justice Thomas said that to require a school
system to hire an additional employee, as would be required by the majority, would saddle
the state with an obligation that it did not anticipate when agreeing to participate in the
federal spending program involved in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Thomas said that when Congress places conditions on the receipt of federal funds it must
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Justice Thomas wrote an opinion for the Court in one unanimous statu-
tory interpretation case during the Court's 1998 term, Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. Jacobson.87 Thomas's opinion contained a strong endorsement of
reliance upon statutory text. The Court decided that the defendant em-
ployer's amendments to a defined benefit plan did not violate the Em-
ployment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) or transform
the employer into a fiduciary. No Justice objected to the textualism im-
plicit in Justice Thomas's opening words on interpretation: "As in any
case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with 'the language of
the statute." 8 8 And where the statutory language provides a clear an-
swer, it ends there as well.89
Justice Thomas went on to find the relevant language of ERISA clear
and not violated because, although the employer had ceased contributing
to the plan, the plan had become overfunded and the employer's amend-
ments did not deprive employees of their accrued benefits or jeopardize
the fund.90 Nor was it a sham transaction.
It seems clear from his current opinions that Justice Thomas adheres to
the theory described in Justice Scalia's essay (although both he and Jus-
tice Scalia make reference to consequences to a greater degree than the
essay suggests).
B. HOLMESIAN WORK IN 1998
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in statutory interpretation cases,
like those of Justices Scalia and Thomas, give heavy weight to the textual
meaning of legislative language. Rehnquist seems, however, to give
somewhat more weight than the other two Justices to traditions he finds
supported by precedents.
The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas when he
dissented in Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,91 one of
three 6-3 statutory interpretation cases in the 1998 term. Justice Rehn-
quist opened his opinion by complaining that the Court had done "little
to explain why the plain language of the statute should not control .... ."92
However, it was clear that the Chief Justice was also giving weight to a
judicially-established tradition. In Murphy, the Court held that the
phrase "receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise," (in order
to start running the thirty-day period for requesting removal of a state
case to a federal court) did not include receipt of a file-stamped com-
do so unambiguously, and it follows that Spending Clause legislation should be interpreted
narrowly. See id. at 1002-03.
87. 119 S. Ct. 755 (1999).
88. Id. at 760 (quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475,
(1992)).
89. Id. (citing Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)).
90. See id. at 764.
91. 119 S. Ct. 1322 (1999).
92. Id. at 1330 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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plaint. Instead, the period could begin only after service of process.93
The result in the case was that the party who sought removal was held to
have made a timely filing of the necessary papers even though the filing
was more than 30 days beyond receiving a file-stamped copy of the com-
plaint. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, said that in so holding the Court
had departed from its practice of strictly construing removal and similar
jurisdictional statutes. 94
In the three statutory interpretation opinions that the Chief Justice
wrote for a unanimous Court in the 1998 term, judicially established tra-
ditions tended to give the statutory language either a narrowed or a
broadened meaning. A case where the words were narrowed was Depart-
ment of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.95 There, an unpaid subcontractor on
an army project sued in federal court for an equitable lien on funds avail-
able to the project and for an order directing payment of those funds to
the unpaid plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that the United States, in Section
702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, had waived sovereign immu-
nity. That Section allows a person who has suffered a legal wrong be-
cause of agency action to sue in federal court for "relief other than money
damages.''96 The Chief Justice rejected the waiver argument by noting
first that in accord with precedent, a waiver of sovereign immunity is to
be strictly construed and must be unequivocally expressed. He then said
that the drafters of Section 702 must have had in mind the time-honored
distinction between damages (which are compensatory or substitute re-
lief) and specific relief. A claim for an equitable lien was not for specific
relief since it was essentially a claim for the recovery of money. Not con-
tent to leave the result supported only by analysis of language, the Chief
Justice said that the Court's holding was in accord with precedent holding
that "sovereign immunity bars creditors from attaching or garnishing
funds in the Treasury or enforcing liens against property owned by the
United States."' 97 Answering the last of the plaintiff's arguments, the
Chief Justice distinguished language in several prior cases as not involv-
ing direct claims against the government.
In contrast to the narrowing interpretation given statutory language in
Blue Fox, a broadened meaning was discovered in Haddle v. Garrison.98
In that 9-0 case an action was brought under the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 99 against conspirators who tried to deter a plaintiff from testifying
at a federal criminal trial and who sought to have plaintiff fired from his
at-will job for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena. The statute created
such an action where there is a conspiracy to injure such party or witness
93. See id. at 1326-27.
94. Id. at 1330.
95. 119 S. Ct. 687 (1999).
96. Id. at 691 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)).
97. Id. at 692.
98. 119 S. Ct. 489 (1998).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1994).
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"in his person or property."'100 The defendants contended that since the
plaintiff had no constitutionally protected interest in continued employ-
ment his discharge did not constitute an actual "injury" under the statute.
Citing Blackstone and several treatises on torts dating back to 1906, the
Chief Justice said that the kind of harm alleged by the petitioner has long
been a compensable injury under tort law. Nothing in the language or
purpose of the proscriptions in Section 1985(2) or its remedial provisions
suggested the need for a constitutionally protected interest to be injured.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's third opinion in a statutory interpretation
case was rendered in Neder v. United States.l0' There he gave great
weight to tradition in resolving the question of whether materiality is an
element of a "scheme or artifice to defraud" under the federal mail fraud,
wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.'0 2 Justice Rehnquist admitted that,
based solely on a natural reading of the full text, materiality would not be
an element of federal fraud statutes criminalizing "any scheme or artifice
to defraud.' 0 3 However, he cited precedent stating that if terms em-
ployed in a statute had at the time of its enactment a well-known meaning
at common law or in the law of this country, they are presumed to have
been used in that sense. Judicial and scholarly materials on the common
law disclosed that the well-settled meaning of "fraud" required a misrep-
resentation or concealment of material fact.1°4 Hence, the Court could
not infer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that
Congress intended to drop that element from its fraud statutes.
C. INSTRUMENTALISM IN 1998
1. Justice Stevens
We now turn to the opposite extreme and consider recent work of Jus-
tice Stevens, whom we have identified as an instrumentalist. Justice Ste-
vens will use textual analysis where he considers the text unambiguous -
at least where the textual meaning carries forward the purposes of the
legislature. An example occurred in Justice Stevens's dissent in Depart-
ment of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives,0 5 where a
5-4 Court held that the Census Act prohibited a proposed use of statisti-
cal sampling in connection with the decennial census for calculating the
population for apportionment purposes. The majority relied on 13 U.S.C.
§ 195. It provides that: "Except for the determination of population for
purposes of apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the
several States, the Secretary may where he deems it appropriate, author-
ize the use of the statistical method known as 'sampling' in carrying out
100. Id. at 491 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (1994)).
101. 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999).
102. Id. at 1840-41.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999).
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the provisions of this title."'1 6 The majority found this section to be the
continuation of a long tradition of barring use of statistical sampling in
determining the population for apportionment purposes. 10 7
Justice Stevens, dissenting with Justices Souter and Ginsburg, relied on
13 U.S.C. § 141(a). It provides that the Secretary of Commerce shall take
a decennial census of population on the first day of April each tenth year,
"in such form and content as he may determine, including the use of sam-
pling procedures and special surveys.' 10 8 According to Justice Stevens,
when Sections 141(a) and 195 are considered together the law unambigu-
ously authorizes sampling procedures but only commands their use when
the determination is not for apportionment purposes. Stevens reasoned
that the clear authorization to use sampling, given in 13 U.S.C. § 141(a),
is not limited by Section 195, which requires sampling for purposes other
than apportionment, if it is feasible. Justice Stevens said this was consti-
tutional as it will make the census more accurate.'0 9
Justice Stevens's lone 5-4 opinion for the Court in a statutory interpre-
tation case during the 1998 term was written in NASA v. F.L.R.A." 0 The
Court there held that an investigator, employed in NASA's Office of In-
spector General, is a "representative" of NASA when examining a
NASA employee, who feared the investigation could result in discipline
against him, so that the employee could invoke a right to union represen-
tation."' NASA contended that the term "representative" was limited to
persons who were part of NASA's management. The Court's opinion re-
jected this contention in light of the contrary position taken by the Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, the fact that there was no central office
coordinating work of inspectors general in a number of federal agencies,
the fact that in many cases there would be cooperation between an in-
spector and management-level personnel, and the policy consideration
that a procedural safeguard for employees who are under investigation by
their agency can only strengthen the morale of the federal workforce,
facilitate the fact-finding process, and lead to a fair resolution of the in-
vestigation-or at least Congress must have thought SO. 1 1 2 Justice
Thomas, dissenting with the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor and
106. Id. at 777 (quoting 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994)).
107. See id.
108. 119 S. Ct. 765, 786 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 13 U.S.C. § 141(a)
(1994)).
109. See id. at 789. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a partial dissent in
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 119 S. Ct. 1392 (1999). He praised the majority opin-
ion of Justice Kennedy which held that certain regulations of the Customs Service were
reasonable and deserved Chevron deference, i.e., controlling weight as statutory interpre-
tations. See id. at 1402. However, he would not remand the case to the lower courts for a
determination as to whether the baking of garments in Mexico to impart permapressing
was less incidental to the assembly process than a duty-free pressing-only operation. Ste-
vens thought the answer to this question was clear and since the Court had granted certio-
rari on the point the Court should simply reverse the judgment below. See id.
110. 119 S. Ct. 1979 (1999).
111. Id. at 1989.
112. See id. at 1985-89.
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Scalia, said that in light of the independence guaranteed to Inspectors
General by statute and commonly understood as a practical reality, they
would not represent agency management in the typical case and should
not be so considered. 113
Justice Stevens wrote only one statutory interpretation opinion during
the 1998 term for a unanimous Court. The case was Pfaff v. Wells Elec-
tronics, Inc. 114 The words requiring interpretation were in Section 102(b)
of the Patent Act of 1952. It provides that no person is entitled to patent
an "invention" that has been "on sale" more than one year before a pat-
ent application is filed." 5
The question was whether the commercial marketing of a new concep-
tion may identify the beginning of the one-year period even though the
"invention" has not yet been reduced to practice (i.e., has not been suc-
cessfully performed). In Pfaff, the inventor had entered into a purchase
order concerning a new device for mounting and removing semi-conduc-
tor chip carriers. The deal was based on detailed engineering drawings
regarding design, dimensions, and materials. The inventor contended
that he should not be considered to have created an "invention" until he
had reduced his concepts to practice. The Court rejected what it called
his "nontextual argument. 11 6 However, the rejection came not because
the argument was nontextual, as might have been the case if Justices
Scalia or Thomas had written the opinion. Instead, Justice Stevens rea-
soned that the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that
encourages the creation and public disclosure of new and useful advances
in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time. In light of that bargain, "invention" must refer to a concept that is
complete. Reduction to practice ordinarily provides the best evidence
that an invention is complete. However, such proof is not always neces-
sary, as illustrated by The Telephone Cases.117 The Court concluded that,
in light of the competing policies involved in the balance, two conditions
must be satisfied before the critical date: product must be the subject of a
commercial offer for sale, and the invention must be ready for patent-
ing-as shown by reduction to practice or the preparation of drawings or
other descriptions sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art
to practice the invention. Both conditions were satisfied here more than
one year before application, so the plaintiff's patent was invalid. 118 [Note
that the test created by the Court in the Stevens opinion was its own
invention - a device intended to accommodate the conflicting policies
identified by the Court but not explicitly enacted by Congress.]
113. See id. at 1994.
114. 119 S. Ct. 304 (1998).
115. Id. at 307 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
116. Id. at 310.
117. See id. at 309 (citing The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887) (Alexander Graham
Bell had a patentable invention even though he had never at the time of application actu-
ally transmitted spoken words that could be distinctly heard and understood at the receiv-
ing end of his line)).
118. See id. at 311-12.
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The first of two statutory interpretation opinions for the Court in 7-2
cases penned by Justice Stevens came in Holloway v. United States.119
With Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting, Stevens wrote that the crime
of carjacking "with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm" 120
could be found where defendant had only the conditional intent to kill or
harm if necessary to effect the carjacking. Stevens began his opinion with
a nod toward language, saying that the Court typically begins the task of
statutory construction by focusing on words that the drafters have chosen.
However, the opinion quickly departed from textualism by saying that
"[I]n interpreting the statute at issue, '[w]e consider not only the bare
meaning' of the critical word or phrase 'but also its placement and pur-
pose in the statutory scheme."1 2'
Two considerations, he said, strongly support the conclusion that a
natural reading of the text is fully consistent with a congressional
decision to cover both species of intent. First, the statute as a whole
reflects an intent to authorize federal prosecutions as a significant
deterrent to a type of criminal activity that was a matter of national
concern. Because that purpose is better served by construing the
statute to cover both the conditional and the unconditional species of
wrongful intent, the entire statute is consistent with a normal inter-
pretation of the specific language that Congress chose.122
Second, said Justice Stevens, it is reasonable to presume that Congress
was familiar with cases and scholarly writings which have recognized that
the "specific intent" to commit a wrongful act may be conditional. l2 3
Justice Stevens' second opinion for a 7-2 Court was in Cedar Rapids
Community School District v. Garret F.124 There he wrote that the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), in calling on schools to
provide "special education and related services," requires a public school
district in a participating state to provide a ventilator-dependent student
with nursing services during school hours. 25 In so holding he followed
Irving Independent School District v. Tatro,126 where the Court had held
that the "medical services" exclusion from what schools must provide re-
ferred only to services that must be performed by a physician. He said
that Congress, in the IDEA, "intended to 'open the door of public educa-
tion' to all qualified children and require participating States to educate
handicapped children with non-handicapped children whenever possi-
ble."'1 27 This includes continuous services that may be more costly and
may require additional school personnel. [It appears that Steven's inter-
pretation of this statute was far more influenced by a desire to implement
119. 119 S. Ct. 966 (1999).
120. Id. at 968 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994 & Supp. III)).
121. Id. at 969 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995)).
122. Id. at 970-71.
123. See id. at 971.
124. 119 S. Ct. 992 (1999).
125. Id. at 995.
126. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
127. Id. at 999.
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congressional policy than to carry out a meaning that might be attached
to the statutory language without giving weight to an inferred purpose.]
D. MODERN NATURAL LAW
1. Justice O'Connor
We now turn to opinions written by Justices who generally adhere to
the methodology used by Chief Justice Marshall - a methodology which
accepts as relevant any source that will contribute to a reasoned result.
When used by these Justices we call it modern natural law. The Justices
are O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
Most of Justice O'Connor's opinions clearly reflect this approach.
However, in two cases, she did not go beyond the text of the statute. In
the only statutory interpretation opinion she wrote for a unanimous
Court during the 1998 term, Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc.,128 she
began with the language of § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations
Act, and she did not find it necessary to go beyond that language, as
interpreted in previous cases. 129
The second "text-only" opinion by Justice O'Connor for the Court
came in Sutton v. United Air Lines,130 which arose under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs in Sutton were twin sisters, both of
whom had severe myopia. Each of the sisters' uncorrected visual acuity
was 20/200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye.
Both had 20/20 vision with the use of corrective lenses. However, United
Air Lines had established a minimum uncorrected vision requirement of
20/100 or better, and the plaintiffs could not meet that requirement.
The issue was whether the sisters were disabled in light of the fact that
their bad vision was correctable by the use of glasses. The ADA defines a
disability in part as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.' 131 It is
not entirely clear from this language whether a disability is supposed to
be measured with or without considering corrective or mitigating meas-
ures. Several federal agencies had enacted regulations indicating that a
128. 119 S. Ct. 292 (1998).
129. See National Labor Relations Act of 1947, § 8(a)(3) 61 Stat. 140 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (194)). The National Labor Relations Act allows an employer and
union to require employees to become "member[s]" of the union as a condition of employ-
ment. As interpreted in previous cases, however, it requires only that employees pay dues
but does not permit unions to exact dues or fees from employees for activities not germane
to collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, or contract administration. Marquez, 119 S.
Ct. at 296. Justice O'Connor first held that it was not a breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation for a union to negotiate a union security clause in the language of the statute, with-
out an explanation of the judicially inferred limitations regarding dues and union functions,
unless the union's conduct was irrational or intended to mislead. See id. at 299-302. A
second holding, on an unrelated matter, was that issues arising from an alleged violation of
a 30-day-grace period contained in the collective bargaining agreement were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB absent facts suggesting that the union violated the stat-
ute by conduct that was arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. See id. at 302-03.
130. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
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disability is determined without considering corrective or mitigating
measures, but the majority held that the act did not give any agencies
authority to interpret the term "disability," so the court did not have to
defer to those agency regulations.132
Sutton is one of those rare cases where it really makes a difference
whether legislative history may be consulted to determine legislative in-
tent. Justice Stevens's dissent points out that the legislative history (the
Senate and House reports) pretty clearly answers the question the same
way that the federal agencies answered the question: a disability is deter-
mined without considering corrective measures. 133 But the Court refused
to even look at the legislative history. According to Justice O'Connor,
"Because we decide that, by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this
manner, we have no reason to consider the ADA's legislative history."'1 34
Justice O'Connor gives three reasons for her conclusion that the text
does not permit an alternative interpretation. First, she notes that the
phrase "substantially limits," which appears in the ADA's definition of
disability, demonstrates that corrective measures must be taken into ac-
count because the phrase "substantially limits" is "in the present indica-
tive verb form."'1 35 Because it is in the present indicative verb form,
O'Connor says that "the language is properly read as requiring that a
person be presently-not potentially or hypothetically-substantially lim-
ited in order to demonstrate a disability.' 36
Second, she argues that the definition of disability requires that disabil-
ities be evaluated "with respect to an individual" and be determined on
whether an impairment limits the "major life activities of such individ-
ual.' 37 She argues that because the determination is statutorily required
to be an "individualized inquiry," this means corrective and mitigating
measures must be taken into account.' 38
The first two reasons are arguably good enough for a true formalist, but
probably would not be thoroughly convincing for a natural law proponent
who ordinarily would want to confirm the reasoning with reference to
other relevant sources. The third reason for sticking to the text is some-
what stronger. Justice O'Connor argues that Congress enacted findings
in the ADA that are inconsistent with an interpretation of disability as
meaning uncorrected conditions. Congress enacted nine findings in sup-
port of the ADA. The first finding was that "some 43,000,000 Americans
have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is in-
creasing as the population as a whole is growing older."'1 39 Although the
Court could not locate the exact source for the forty-three million figure,
132. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145-46.
133. Id. at 2153-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2146.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2147 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)).
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it was clear, based on a variety of reports that were before Congress at
the time the ADA was enacted, that the forty-three million figure must
have excluded persons whose impairments are largely corrected by medi-
cation or other devices. According to the reports, if disability was de-
fined to include all persons with substantial impairments, even
impairments that were corrected, the number should have been in the
range of 160 million. 140 Thus, since the finding was consistent with a nar-
row interpretation of disability and inconsistent with a broader definition,
the Court felt obliged to adopt the narrower interpretation and to ignore
contrary indications in the legislative history.' 41 Even if the majority had
consulted the legislative history, it would have felt compelled to follow
the direction set by the statutory findings.
Opinions on statutory interpretation by natural law Justices give weight
to whatever aspect of the situation best supports a reasonable result.
Often that is the text, but not always so. In Lopez v. Monterey County,142
an 8-1 case, the Court held that a covered county must obtain federal
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when it "seeks to ad-
minister" a voting change even if its action is a nondiscretionary act
needed to comply with the law of its noncovered state.' 43 Justice
O'Connor said that for this interpretation she relied primarily on the face
of the law. She pointed out that according to several dictionaries, the
phrase "seeks to administer" suggests non-discretionary terms.' 44 How-
ever, Justice O'Connor also found relevant a common practice to request
preclearance for the administration of laws by partly-covered States
before those laws take effect in covered jurisdictions. She added that it
was especially relevant that the Attorney General read the law as does
the Court, because the Attorney General has a central role in implement-
ing the law and the Court has traditionally given substantial deference to
the Attorney General's interpretation of Section 5.145 Justice O'Connor
went on to indicate that the Attorney General's application of Section 5
did not violate principles of federalism since the Voting Rights Act was
enacted pursuant to Congress' power to legislate under the Fifteenth
Amendment.' 46
In her opinion on census sampling, Justice O'Connor began her discus-
sion by reciting the historical background of the Act's present text.' 47 She
later turned to the debate and discussions surrounding the 1976 amend-
ments to the Act (the portion of her opinion to which, not surprisingly,
140. Id. at 2148.
141. See id. at 2149. Justice Ginsburg concurred, explaining that "[tihese declarations
are inconsistent with the enormously embracing definition of disability petitioners urge."
Id. at 2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
142. 119 S. Ct. 693 (1999).
143. See id. at 700-01.
144. See id. at 701.
145. See id. at 701-02.
146. See id. at 704.
147. See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 119 S.
Ct. 765 (1999).
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Justice Scalia objected in his concurrence). The key fact for the majority
was that prior to 1972, the Congress had clearly prohibited the use of
sampling in matters relating to apportionment. Justice O'Connor said
that changes made in 1972 did not clearly seek to abolish that tradition.
Instead, the drafters merely changed a provision that permitted the use of
sampling for purposes other than apportionment into one that required
sampling to be used for such purposes, if "feasible.' '148
In Kolstad v. American Dental Association,149 Justice O'Connor, writ-
ing for a 5-4 majority, considered the availability of punitive damages
under Title VII. Until 1991, Title VII did not permit an award of punitive
damages. It was amended that year to expand its remedies, but punitive
damages were limited to cases in which the employer had engaged in in-
tentional discrimination "with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual." 150 In rejecting the
lower court's holding that punitive damages could be awarded only in
cases involving "egregious" misconduct, Justice O'Connor relied upon
the text of the statute (which did not mention "egregiousness" and was
focused on the employer's state of mind instead of on the employer's
conduct), the Court's interpretation of punitive damages under Section
1983 (on which Congress relied in enacting Section 1981a), and the
Court's assessment of the traditional common law standards for awarding
punitive damages.' 51 In a second part of the opinion dealing with an em-
ployer's vicarious liability for punitive damages based upon a manager's
conduct, Justice O'Connor began with common law agency principles and
then imposed an additional "good faith efforts" limitation in order to
make punitive damage vicarious liability consistent with Title VII's goal
of encouraging employers to prevent discrimination in the workplace, to
adopt antidiscrimination policies, and to educate employees on Title
VII's prohibitions.152 Her interpretation was clearly informed by a con-
sideration of more than the statutory text and took account of broad,
underlying legislative policies and a commonsense assessment of how em-
ployers were likely to respond to the Restatement's broad standards on
vicarious liability for managerial misconduct.
Perhaps the most interesting statutory interpretation opinion by Justice
O'Connor for the Court during the 1998 term was in Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ.153 In that 5-4 decision, Justice O'Connor moved
away from the group of Justices with whom she is most often associated,
i.e., Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas.
She and Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg read Title IX to
create a private right of action against a school board in cases of student-
on-student harassment. Justice O'Connor relied primarily on Gebser v.
148. Id. at 777.
149. 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
151. Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124-26.
152. Id. at 2129.
153. 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999).
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Lago Vita Indeprndent School District,154 which held that a school which
is a recipient of federal education funds may be liable in damages under
Title IX where the school is deliberately indifferent to known acts of sex-
ual harassment by one of its teachers. 155
Justice Kennedy dissented, with Chief Justice Rehinquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas. Kennedy found no congressional intent to create an
action where recipients have such little control over harassment as
schools have over student behavior. He predicted dire financial burdens
on local school districts. That was so counter to his concepts of federal-
ism that he could not believe Congress so intended, absent clear statutory
language.
Replying to Justice Kennedy's dissent, Justice O'Connor said the action
was limited to situations where the recipient of federal funds has re-
sponded to known peer harassment in a manner that is clearly unreasona-
ble - as where the recipient is deliberately indifferent even though it
exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in
which known harassment occurs. Justice O'Connor added that the har-
assment must be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it
effectively bars the victim's access to an educational opportunity or bene-
fit. Since there is no clear statutory basis for this complex test, one is
tempted to attribute it primarily to a strong sense of antipathy toward
sexual harassment shared by a majority of the Court. 156
2. Justice Kennedy
One of Justice Kennedy's two statutory interpretation decisions for a
unanimous Court in the 1998 term was readily decided by using the Chev-
ron doctrine 157 to support deference to an administrative interpretation.
Specifically, in I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre,158 Justice Kennedy wrote that
the Chevron principles of deference to administrative interpretations ap-
plied to regulations giving concrete meaning to ambiguous statutory
terms. The relevant interpretations had been promulgated by the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) using power delegated by the Attorney
General to whom, in turn, such power was expressly given by
Congress.159
154. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
155. See id.
156. A final opinion by Justice O'Connor is not worth mentioning in the text. Writing
for a unanimous Court in Martin v. Hadix, 119 S. Ct. 1998 (1999), Justice O'Connor applied
a "traditional presumption" against retroactivity to hold that the federal prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, which sets new limits on attorney fee awards to inmates who sue over
prison conditions, applies only to legal work performed after the law's effective date. Id. at
2008.
157. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Under Chevron, an agency's construction of a statute which it administers is given
great weight and is accepted if reasonable. Id. at 865.
158. 119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999).
159. See id. at 1445-46. Justice Kennedy said that the BIA had reasonably interpreted
the exception to withholding deportation of an alien whose life or freedom would be
threatened by a return where the alien had committed a "serious nonpolitical crime
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In United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,160 Justice Kennedy held that
the Court of International Trade must apply Chevron principles of defer-
ence to a Customs Service regulation. 161 So deciding, he remanded for
decision below on whether a reasonable decision had been made by ad-
ministrative authorities below in holding that baking garments to induce
permapressing was an "operation incidental to the assembly process."'1 62
In Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indiana Tribe,163 Justice Kennedy
did reach a final interpretation decision when writing for a 7-1-1 Court
(Justice O'Connor not participating and Justice Ginsburg dissenting).
Kennedy held that when the United States transferred to the Southern
Ute Indian Tribe all of the "coal" under certain lands that the United
States had reserved to itself under the Coal Lands Acts of 1909 and 1919,
the transfer did not include coalbed methane gas (CBM gas). 164 Thus,
the holders of the land, which had been patented to setters under the
1909 and 1910 Acts (minus reserved "coal"), could grant leases to oil and
gas companies for producing CBM from some 200,000 acres in which the
Tribe owned the "coal." Justice Kennedy did not rely on current under-
standing of the meaning of "coal." Instead, he applied the rule that
"[u]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordi-
nary, contemporary, common meaning at the time Congress enacted a
statute."'1 65 The Court was persuaded that when Congress passed the
1909 and 1910 Acts the common conception of "coal" was the solid rock
substance that was the country's primary energy resource at that time. At
that time, CBM was regarded as a dangerous waste product which posed
a serious threat to mine safety. It was only after the Arab oil embargo in
the early 1970s that the federal government began to encourage the pro-
outside the United States prior to arrival in the States." Id. at 1448. The BIA's interpreta-
tion was that an act should be considered a serious nonpolitical crime if the act was dispro-
portionate to the objective. The Ninth Circuit had erred by seeking to impose additional
tests, such as the risks of prosecution, whether the acts were "grossly" out of proportion or
were of an atrocious nature, and whether they were politically "necessary" and met with
"success." Id. The Court approved the BIA approach which allowed the criminal element
of an offense to outweigh its political aspect even if none of the acts were deemed atrocious
and without considering necessity or success beyond asking whether they were dispropor-
tionate to political objectives.
160. 119 S. Ct. 1392 (1999).
161. Id. at 1395. The regulation had interpreted a statutory exemption of duties for
articles assembled abroad which have not been advanced in value or improved except by
being assembled and except by "operations incidental to the assembly process such as
cleaning, lubricating, and painting." 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (1994). The regulation provided that
examples of operations not considered incidental include "permapressing." The Court re-
manded to the Court of International Trade to determine how Chevron deference should
be applied where the process involved was the baking of trousers in order to activate a
permapressing process. See id. at 1401.
162. See Haggar, 119 S. Ct. at 1401. Dissenting was Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Ginsburg. Stevens said the regulation below was a reasonable elaboration of the statute
and should stand. Id. at 1402.
163. 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999).
164. Id. at 1727.
165. Id. at 1724.
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duction of CBM gas. 166
3. Justice Souter
Several opinions by Justice Souter clearly evidence the natural law de-
cision-making style of using any and all sources to discover what reason
suggests was intended. In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie,167 Justice
Souter wrote for a 9-0 Court that the "comity considerations" which ordi-
narily allow Tribal Courts, in the first instance, to determine whether they
have jurisdiction over a claim, did not apply where Congress, in the Price-
Anderson Act, had provided in the interest of speed and efficiency that
"any legal liability action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear acci-
dent" was within the jurisdiction of federal courts. 168 Justice Souter also
ruled that such cases brought in a state court could be removed to a fed-
eral court. He said that the terms of the Act were underscored by legisla-
tive history in which concern was expressed about the multitude of
separate cases that might be brought in various courts. Failure to provide
for tribal-court removal was most likely an inadvertence because no in-
stance of nuclear testing labs or reactors in Indian lands appears to have
been brought to the attention of Congress.
Justice Souter also wrote for a 9-0 Court in Clinton v. Goldsmith.169
There, it was held that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) did not have authority to enjoin the executive action involved in
dropping a commissioned officer from the rolls. The reason given was
that such a writ wasn't "necessary or appropriate in aid of the court's
jurisdiction," as required by statute. Justice Souter pointed out that the
act creating the CAAF limited its power so that it could act only with
respect to the findings and sentence of a court martial. Further, both
precedent and leading treatises affirmed that the All Writs Act did not
enlarge the CAAF's jurisdiction.170 Justice Souter's third unanimous
opinion of this genre appeared in Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.171 In
this case, the Court allowed an employer to fire a driver who could not
meet the basic vision standards promulgated by the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT). The driver contended that this violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act because he had applied for a waiver of those re-
166. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, would apply the canon that ambiguities in land grants
are construed in favor of the sovereign-so that the United States in reserving "coal," had
also reserved CBM. Id. at 1728. Justice Kennedy replied that the Court need not consider
that canon since it had decided that the most natural interpretation of "coal" did not in-
clude CBM gas (i.e., there was no ambiguity). See id. at 1727.
167. 119 S. Ct. 1430 (1999).
168. See id. at 1437 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2210(n)(2) (1994)).
169. 119 S. Ct. 1538 (1999).
170. Justice Souter concluded that use of the All Writs Act was not necessary or appro-
priate because power under that Act was essentially equitable and should therefore not be
generally available to provide a remedy if adequate alternatives were available at law, as
was true here. See id, at 1543. The Court did not reach the question of whether executive
action removing an officer from the rolls based on a statute enacted after the officer's
conviction was unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto or Double Jeopardy Clauses.
171. 119 S.Ct. 2162 (1999)
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quirements under an experimental DOT program. Delving into legisla-
tive history, Justice Souter pointed out that the waiver scheme had been
proposed as a means of obtaining information bearing on whether it was
justifiable to revise the standards already in place.172 He said the DOT's
intent was not to modify the content of the general visual acuity stan-
dards in any way or to require an employer to accept the hypothesis and
participate in the Government's experiment.173 Justice Thomas, concur-
ring, said "he preferred to hold that the [driver,] as a matter of law was
not qualified to perform the job he sought within the meaning of the
ADA."1' 74
Balancing in light of legislative purpose was used by Justice Souter in
the 8-1 case of Bank of America v. 203 N. Lasalle St. Partnership.175 In
this case, the majority approved the refusal of a district court to accept a
bankrupt reorganization plan which gave existing shareholders an exclu-
sive right to contribute new capital and thereafter to receive ownership
interests in the reorganized company. 176 Justice Souter examined legisla-
tive history to find that the statute could be interpreted to have aban-
doned the traditional "absolute priority rule" which required that
creditors be paid before the stockholders could retain equity interests for
any purpose whatsoever. 177 Further, even if today's version of the statute
could be read to permit old equity to retain an interest if the greatest
possible addition to the bankrupt estate had been obtained, the plan
before the Court must fail because no opportunity had been extended to
others to compete for the equity or to propose a competing reorganiza-
tion plan.' 78
A 5-4 case in which the Court did not divide along conventional ideo-
logical or methodological lines was Jones v. U.S.179 In that case, the ma-
jority opinion, written by Justice Souter, was joined by Justices Stevens,
Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy filed a dissent, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Breyer joined. For
the majority, Justice Souter referred to the "better reading" of the stat-
ute, reinforced by applying the rule of resolving interpretive uncertainty
to avoid serious questions about unconstitutionality. The statute in ques-
tion, 18 U.S.C. Section 2119, provided that whoever, possessing a firearm,
takes a motor vehicle in interstate commerce from another by force or
172. Id. at 2171.
173. Id. at 2172-74.
174. Id. at 2175.
175. 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 1417-19.
178. Justice Stevens dissented. Drawing on views of Justice Douglas, he proposed a
different test, one which in light of what is fair, would create greater flexibility than sug-
gested by the majority. Stevens said that "[w]henever a junior claimant receives or retains
an interest for a bargain price, it does so 'on account of' its prior claim. On the other hand,
if the new capital that it invests has an equivalent or greater value than its interest in the
reorganized venture, it should be equally clear that its participation is based on the fair
price being paid and that it is not 'on account of' its old claim or equity." Id. at 1427.
179. 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999).
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violence shall - (1) be fined or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or
both, (2) if serious bodily injury results, be fined or imprisoned not more
than twenty-five years, or both, and (3) if death results, be fined or im-
prisoned for any number of years up to life, or both.180 The jury found
the defendant guilty under an instruction which did not mention bodily
injury. The issue was whether the second and third paragraphs were sen-
tencing considerations, solely for the judge, or whether they were ele-
ments of an offense, each of which must be charged by indictment,
proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a
jury for its verdict.
Justice Souter opened his opinion by concluding that the "look" of the
statute, as a list of elements followed by three sentencing guides, was not
a reliable guide in view of the further facts that condition longer prison
sentences. 181 His opinion went on to rely on a backdrop of state practice
and other federal statutes which have defined serious bodily injury as an
element in the offense of aggravated robbery. Justice Souter then re-
jected the government's reliance on several statements by legislators
which described subsection (2) as providing a "penalty enhancement.' '182
Souter said that there were other statements suggesting an assumption
that subsection (2) established an element that had to be proven at trial.
The matter not having been conclusively established either way, Justice
Souter relied on the doctrine of interpreting to avoid constitutional
doubt. The doubt arose from the fact that there was
a question under both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the jury guarantee of the Sixth: when a jury deter-
mination has not been waived, may judicial factfinding by a prepon-
derance of the evidence support the application of a provision that
increases the potential severity of the penalty for a variety of a given
crime? 8 3
Justice Souter, looking at judicial history, found indications of efforts to
give juries more control over the ultimate verdict.' 84
Justice Kennedy's dissent characterized the majority as having given
the statute a strained reading, according to which a single statutory sec-
tion prohibits three distinct offenses. Kennedy said the first reading or
initial look of the statute, which suggests that clauses (1) - ( 3) are sen-
tencing factors, is confirmed by further study of structure and legislative
history. However, Justice Kennedy was far more concerned with what he
thought was misuse of the constitutional doubt rule. The reason is that he
read Almendarez-Torres v. United States' 85 as clearly holding that Con-
gress could establish serious bodily injury and death as sentencing factors
180. Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 1218 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1219 (1988 & Supp. V)).
181. Id. at 1219.
182. Id. at 1221.
183. Id. at 1224.
184. Justice Scalia concurred because he had arrived at the considered view that it was
unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressio-
nally prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. Id. at 1229.
185. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
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rather than offense elements.186 He concluded that the Court's holding
would create confusion in the states, many of which have given vast dis-
cretion to the trial judge, when the issue relates to the consequences of a
completed criminal act or, in death penalty cases, where the state has the
judge rule on the aggravated character of the defendant's conduct. Jus-
tice Souter replied that the Court's repeated emphasis on the distinctive
significance of recidivism in Almendarez-Torres v. United States made
clear that the Court regarded recidivism as potentially distinguishable for
constitutional purposes from other facts that might extend the range of
possible sentencing.
In California Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C.,187 Justice Souter held, on a 9-0
vote, that nonprofit professional associations are subject to FTC jurisdic-
tion. However, he garnered only five votes to hold that more than a
"quick look" had to be taken at the dental association's restrictions on
price and quality advertising to determine whether they had anticompeti-
tive effects.188 Thus, the "quick look" judgment below was vacated and
remanded.189
Dissenting, Justice Breyer, for himself and Justices Stevens, Kennedy,
and Ginsburg, said that the anticompetitive aspects of restricting truthful
advertising about lower prices is obvious, the dental association had not
shown that a redeeming virtue existed in practice, and the Court below,
in its "quick look," had therefore correctly applied the rule of reason.190
4. Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg's most important statutory interpretation case was
Olmstead v. Zimring,191 where the Court construed the anti-discrimina-
tion provision contained in the public services portion of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.192 The main issue in the case was whether
the Act's prohibition against discrimination required, in some cases,
placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings in-
stead of in institutions. In support of the conclusion that the Act did
cover such discrimination, Justice Ginsburg relied upon the consistent po-
sition taken by the Department of Justice, 193 that the history of other
measures enacted by Congress "to secure opportunities for people with
developmental disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living,"'1 94
and the commonsense conclusions that placement of an individual in an
institution can be stigmatizing and reduces the individual's ability to par-
ticipate in everyday life activities. 195 Her approach, which attempted to
186. See Jones, 119 S. Ct. at 1231.
187. 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999).
188. Id. at 1607.
189. Id. at 1618.
190. Id. at 1622-24.
191. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
193. See Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
194. Id. at 2186.
195. See id. at 2187.
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put the language in the statute in its historical context, is usefully con-
trasted with Justice Thomas' dissent in the case, joined by Justice Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, which focuses virtually all of its cannon fire
upon crafting a definition of the word "discrimination" that would be es-
sentially invariant regardless of the statutory context in which the word is
used.196
In the 1998 term, Justice Ginsburg was assigned to write three nine to
zero opinions for the Court. In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Smith,197 a unanimous Court held that the receipt of dues from federally
funded member institutions did not bring the NCAA within the scope of
Title IX, which provides for private actions based on sexual discrimina-
tion. The decision was based on applying a rule established by Supreme
Court precedent. 198
In Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth,199 the Court held that allowing the de-
frauded beneficiaries of a health group insurer to sue for treble damages
under Rackateer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
would not "impair" Nevada's less generous remedies for fraud by insur-
ance companies and, thus, was not barred by the McCarran-Ferguson Act
(which precludes application of federal law that would "impair" state law
regulating the business of insurance). 2°° Justice Ginsburg first recited the
history which brought the McCarran-Ferguson Act into existence. She
then turned to dictionaries, more direct ways for Congress to preempt the
field than to speak of "impairing," and analogy to tax laws. 201 Finding a
line between field preemption by the states and a congressional green
light for any federal regulation that does not collide head on with state
regulation, Justice Ginsburg articulated a new test: "[w]hen federal law
does not directly conflict with state regulation, and when application of
the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere
with a State's administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does
not preclude its application [of federal law]."' 20 2 Justice Ginsburg sup-
196. See id. at 2194-95.
197. 119 S.Ct. 924 (1999).
198. The Court had previously held that a school falls under Title IX if it enrolls stu-
dents who receive federal funds earmarked for educational purposes. See Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). However, the Court had also held that commercial air
carriers are not within title IX even if airport operators received federal funds for airport
construction. United States Dep't of Trans. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597
(1986). In Paralyzed Veterans, the Court said that application of Title IX against all who
benefit economically from federal assistance would yield almost limitless coverage. Id. at
608. Justice Ginsburg wrote that entities that receive federal assistance, whether directly
or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only
benefit economically from federal assistance are not. Id. at 612. Applying that test, Justice
Ginsburg said that the NCAA's receipt of dues demonstrates only that it indirectly benefits
from the federal assistance afforded its members. The Court did not go on to decide an
issue not dealt with below, namely, that when a recipient cedes controlling authority over a
federally funded program to another entity, the controlling entity is covered by Title IX
regardless whether it is itself a recipient. See NCAA v. Smith, 199 S.Ct. at 924 (1999).
199. 119 S. Ct. 710 (1999)
200. Id. at 716.
201. Id. at 717.
202. Id. at 717.
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ported that new rule by analogy to cases finding other state laws not pre-
empted by a variety of federal laws not intended to "impair" state laws.
The third unanimous opinion in 1998 on statutory interpretation was
written by Justice Ginsburg in Unum Life Insurance Co. of America v.
Ward.203 An insurance company, which had issued an employee's long-
term group disability policy, refused the employee's disability claim be-
cause it had not been furnished to the insurance company within the time
allowed by policy terms-one year and 180 days after onset of the disabil-
ity. The employee sued under section 502(a) of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). ERISA preempts state laws
to the extent they "relate to any employee benefit plan," provided that
exempted from the preemption is "any law of any State which regulates
insurance. '20 4 The employee relied on the California rule that an insurer
cannot avoid liability because of an untimely proof of claim unless the
insurer shows it was prejudiced by the delay. The Court held that this
California rule "regulated insurance" and so had not been pre-empted by
ERISA.205
An 8-1 opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg in El Al Israel Airlines,
Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng.20 6 The plaintiff, who sued under New York tort
law, had been subjected to a humiliating search upon debarking from de-
fendant's airline. 207 It was agreed by the parties, and accepted by the
Supreme Court, that under the Warsaw Convention, which governs air
carrier liability for all international transportation, there had not been an
"accident" (for which the treaty expressly provides the only remedy), or
"wilful misconduct" (for which the treaty does not limit remedies). 208
Justice Ginsburg began her search for interpretation premises by stating
that since a ratified treaty was "not only the law of the land but also an
agreement among sovereign powers," the Court has "traditionally consid-
ered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and drafting history," the
reasonable views of the Executive Branch, the opinions of sister signato-
ries, and the Convention's text, purpose, and overall structure.209 Each
203. 119 S. Ct. 1380 (1999).
204. ERISA section 502(a) (1974).
205. Unum, 119 S. Ct. at 1385. Justice Ginsburg supported the result by reference to
precedent which advised the Court first to consider a "common-sense view" of the matter.
Id. at 1386. Then to apply three factors in determining whether the regulated practice (1)
transfers or spreads policyholder risk; (2) is an integral part of the policy relationships
between the insurer and the insured, and (3) is limited to entities within the insurance
industry. Id. Applying its rules the Court said that although barring for untimely proof
does not transfer risk, the rule regulating insurance meets all of the other tests. See id. at
1389. Further, the rule complements rather than conflicts with substantive provisions of
ERISA. See id. Finally, the Court held that a California rule, which would make the em-
ployer an agent of the insurance company and, trump a policy provision denying that the
policyholding employer is an agent of the insurance company, was a law relating to em-
ployee benefits plans but not one that regulates insurance. Id. at 1385. Thus, the Califor-
nia agency rule was contrary to ERISA, which would enforce the policy provision. Id.
206. 119 S. Ct. 662 (1999).
207. See id. at 667.
208. Id. at 670.
209. Id. at 671.
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of those sources pointed to the Convention providing exclusively for lia-
bility, as did a later Protocol recently ratified by the Senate.210
Justice Stevens' dissent would have allowed the plaintiff to recover. He
first said that "a treaty, like an Act of Congress, should not be construed
to preempt state law unless its intent to do so is clear."21' He added that
the treaty goal of "uniformity would not be significantly impaired" by
allowing New York law to apply in this case since only a tiny sliver of
cases arise in which there is injury on debarkation which is not the result
of an accident or wilful misconduct.212 Justice Ginsburg replied that the
Court's usual "home-centered preemption analysis" should not be "ap-
plied mechanically in construing our international obligations. '2 13
5. Justice Breyer
It appears from his 1998-99 opinions that Justice Breyer, more so than
his colleagues, analyzes consequences in his search for legislative intent.
He wrote a 9-0 opinion in Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc, 21 4 an action for
Sherman Act antitrust violations. The Court held that the per se rule in a
"boycott context" is limited by precedents to situations involving "hori-
zontal agreements among direct competitors. '215 Hence the per se rule
did not apply where a single buyer favored one seller over another, even
for an improper and not a competitive reason.2 16 Justice Breyer sup-
ported this holding by analyzing social and business consequences. He
said that extending the "per se rule" to this situation "would discourage
firms from changing suppliers even where the competitive process itself
[would] not suffer. '2 17 He also said that a boycott agreement does not
amount to a conspiracy to monopolize in the absence of a showing that
the agreement harmed the competitive process.218
Again for a 9-0 Court, Justice Breyer wrote the opinion in Cleveland v.
Policy Management Systems Corp.219 The Court held that pursuing and
receiving Social Security disability benefits, for which a person is eligible
only if unable to do previous work or other kind of substantial gainful
work, does not automatically estop the recipient from pursuing an action
for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).220 The reason is that a person is entitled to ADA protection if
the person, with "reasonable accommodation," could "perform the essen-
tial functions" of the recipients job. The Social Security disability pro-
210. See id. at 674-75.
211. Id. at 677.
212. Id. at 677.
213. Id. at 675.
214. 119 S. Ct. 493 (1998).
215. Id. at 498.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 500.
219. 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
220. Id. at 1602.
[Vol. 53
FOUR THEORIES IN DISARRAY
gram contains no such qualification. 221 Justice Breyer went on to hold
that although there was no estoppel, the recipient must explain, to survive
a motion for summary judgment, why the essential functions of his or her
job could be performed, at least with "reasonable accommodation. '222 In
explanation of this method for accommodating the two Acts, Justice
Breyer noted that both seek to help individuals with disabilities, but in
different ways. He could see several situations where the two claims do
not inherently conflict, e.g., where reasonable accommodation is possible
(since SSDI doesn't take that into account); during an SSA nine-month
trial-work period; after changes in a disability over time; or during the
pendency of an SSDI claim.2 23
A six to three statutory interpretation case written for the Court by
Justice Breyer during the 1998 term was Richardson v. United States.224
There the Court dealt with the continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21
U.S.C. section 848(a).225 The statute punishes a violation of federal drug
laws if "such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations" under-
taken in concert with five or more others from which the defendant ob-
tains substantial income or resources.226 The Court held that each
individual "violation" is an element upon which a jury must unanimously
agree.227 Each violation was not merely a means by which members of
the jury could find a "continuing series." Justice Breyer said that the
word "violations" imports an element. Further, there is sufficient danger
of unfairness in interpreting it as merely a means that the Court should
apply the rule of avoiding constitutional questions if reasonable alterna-
tive interpretations are available.
Justice Kennedy dissented, with Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg. He
said that "[n]owhere in the text of the statute or legislative history does
Congress showed an interest in the particular predicate violations consti-
tuting the continuing series. '228 Congress' purpose was to punish drug
king pins. Justice Kennedy concluded that this would be made very diffi-
cult if individual violations had to be proved.229 Nor was there any con-
stitutional problem where the government had to prove not only a
continuing series but also action in concert with five or more persons and
substantial income or resources derived from the continuing series.230
A second six to three Justice Breyer opinion appeared in Dickinson v.
Zurko.231 In this case, the Court held that judicial review of findings of
fact made by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) should be governed
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1604.
223. Id. at 1603.
224. 119 S. Ct. 1707 (1999).
225. See id. at 1709.
226. Id. at 1709, 1713.
227. Id. at 1713.
228. Richardson, 114 S. Ct. at 1715.
229. See id. at 1716.
230. Id.
231. 119 S. Ct. 1816 (1999).
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by the "substantial evidence" standard of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) rather than the somewhat stricter "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard used for judicial review of judicial findings of fact. 232 The APA in
Section 559 says that it does "not limit or repeal additional require-
ments ... recognized by law."'233 It was argued that the court/court stan-
dard was such an additional requirement. Rejecting this contention,
Justice Breyer reviewed dozens of precedents to conclude that they did
not reflect a well-established stricter court/court standard for review of
PTO fact finding. Conceding that the choice of standards probably would
not make much difference in practice, the Court preferred not to create a
precedent that would permit other agencies to depart from uniform APA
requirements. 234
Another Breyer opinion apparently based in large part on an analysis
of consequences was delivered in National Federation of Employees v.
Department of Interior,235 a 5-4 case. Justice Breyer's opinion was joined
by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg. Justice O'Connor
dissented with Chief Justice Rehnquist and, in part, she was joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. The majority decided that there was ambigu-
ity as to whether midterm bargaining was required by the Federal Service
Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. section 7114(a)(4). 236
This Act provides that federal agencies and the unions that represent
their employees must "meet and negotiate in good faith for the purposes
of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement. '237 The majority held
that Congress delegated to the agency charged with administering the
statute (the Federal Labor Relations Authority of FLRA), the power to
determine whether, when, where, and what sort of midterm bargaining is
required. 238
Justice O'Connor, dissenting, said that the language of the statute, as
well as the context in which it is used, demonstrates that the statute
unambiguously imposes only a duty to negotiate for the purpose of arriv-
ing at a collective bargaining agreement - which means a basic agreement
and not a midterm modification or supplementation to the primary agree-
ment. She said this law stands in stark contrast to the National Labor
Relations Act which calls for midterm bargaining by language which im-
poses a duty to bargain about, "the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder. '239 Justice O'Connor said the federal labor
statute was aimed at promoting effective and efficient government. This
would not result if a union could keep raising new issues and by bargain-
ing to impasse, putting them in the hands of the Federal Service Impasses
232. Id. at 1823.
233. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1994).
234. 119 S. Ct. at 1823.
235. 119 S. Ct. 1003 (1999).
236. National Federation, 119 S. Ct. at 1007.
237. Id. at 1012.
238. National Fed'n of Employees, 119 S. Ct. at 1011.
239. Id. at 1013.
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Panel. Even if there was an ambiguity, little deference was owed to the
FLRA's current interpretation that there is a duty to bargain midterm
since the agency had reversed course on this matter in light of a holding
by the D.C. Circuit. Justice Breyer replied to the policy argument by ask-
ing whether, without midterm bargaining, "will it prove possible to find a
collective solution to a workplace problem, say a health or safety hazard,
that first appeared midterm?" 240
Another 5-4 opinion of Justice Breyer, which relies heavily on analysis
of consequences, appears in West v Gibson.241 In that case the majority
decided that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
possesses the legal authority to require federal agencies to pay compensa-
tory damages when they discriminate in employment because of the stat-
utory language "authority to enforce.., through appropriate remedies,"
and because of purposes and history.2 42 Referring to the word "appropri-
ate," Justice Breyer said that: "Words in statutes can enlarge or contract
their scope as other changes, in law or in the world, require their applica-
tion to new instances or make old applications anachronistic. ' 243 He con-
cluded that to deny an EEOC compensatory damages award would
undermine the general purpose of remedying discrimination in federal
employment by forcing into court matters that the EEOC might have
resolved.244
IV. CONCLUSION
The above review may be used as background for some general obser-
vations on the law of statutory interpretation, strategy for advocates in
interpretation cases, and reflections on the quality of the Court's work.
The law appears to be roughly as follows: If statutory text is held to be
unambiguous, and not unconstitutional, it will be applied. However, am-
biguity is readily perceived when suggested by any of a variety of sources
including other words in the Act, legislative history, the application of
interpretive canons, interpretations by an agency charged with adminis-
tering the Act, and the Court's conclusions about the purpose of the law
and whether a particular interpretation would serve that purpose. In-
deed, it appears that some Justices will find ambiguity if a result sug-
gested by the text is not absurd but is merely at odds with prevailing
practice or with policies a Justice perceives are called for by a reasonable
rule of law. The Court is often willing to forgo an authoritative full-scale
240. Id. at 1008-09.
241. 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999).
242. Id. at 1908.
243. Id. at 1910.
244. Id. Justice Kennedy, dissenting with the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, concluded that a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States must be
made in unequivocal statutory language and the phrase "appropriate remedies" does not
constitute such a waiver. Id. at 1913. Further, said Justice Kennedy, it is well-settled that a
"statute's legislative history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any
statutory text." Id. at 1915 (quoting Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996)).
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inquiry if the agency charged with administering a law has promulgated a
reasonable interpretation or if a particular interpretation would raise
plausible constitutional issues.
The consequence for advocates is that any proffered interpretation
needs to be supported not only by an analysis of the statutory language
but also by efforts to show that the suggested meaning is in accord with
context, including other portions of the same statute, legislative history,
and any purposes the Justices may infer were intended by the legislature
to be accomplished. A suggested interpretation may also be strengthened
if it is the view taken by an agency authorized to administer the law or if
it avoids a substantial constitutional issue.
Is it unsettling for the Supreme Court to have given us little more than
the above by way of law for statutory interpretation? If the Congress and
other legislatures were drafting legislation in light of settled expectations
concerning one theory of statutory interpretation, the situation would not
be desirable. However, today there is no set tradition for drafting legis-
lation. Where that is so, each of the approaches has some claim for
legitimacy.
Our view is that the modem natural law method is best suited for to-
day. The reason is that where there is no set tradition for drafting legisla-
tion, an effort to look at all sources when determining the existence of
ambiguity and legislative intent seems a rational method for dealing with
problems of interpretation. Perspectives which look only at the words,
which give great emphasis to "goodness" in results, or which concentrate
on the meaning of words rather than the purposes of the legislature, seem
to us less likely to carry out what the legislature has intended to enact by
its statutory language. We do not expect, however, that Justices who ad-
here to a different perspective are likely to be looking for reasons to
change. And, perhaps in an increasingly diverse society, it is just as well
that no one view has captured the allegiance of the entire Court.
[Vol. 53
